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CODEX IMAGINARIUS: VISUAL CODES IN LAND
USE PLANNING AND AESTHETIC REGULATION
Stephen M. Judge*
INTRODUCTION
New Urbanism, with its appeal to lost values of community and its
promise of thriving, dense, walkable, and integrated communities, has
captured the imagination of city planners, environmentalists, and civic
activists in communities across the country. Architects and planners
subscribing to the New Urbanist credo are involved with projects as
diverse as urban infill redevelopment in aging cities to wholesale re-
construction of Gulf Coast communities devastated by Hurricane Ka-
trina.' Just as broad as the range of communities and situations that
New Urbanism has attracted is the breadth of its vision for reshaping
the way in which we plan and regulate land use.
This Note aims to single out one aspect of the New Urbanist
agenda-the attempt to rethink the way in which development plans
are drafted and codified by simplifying codes and replacing or supple-
menting text with pictorial illustrations-and to analyze its feasibility
and impact on the land use planning process. Although there may be
plenty of room for discussion on the wisdom and desirability of the
New Urbanism movement generally, the questions this Note asks are
much less broad: assuming that localities choose to incorporate New
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2007; B.A., Loyola
College in Maryland, 2001. I would like to thank Professor Nicole Stelle Garnett for
the inspiration of this idea and her helpful comments, the members of the Notre Dame
Law Review for their diligent efforts getting this Note in shape for publication, and,
most especially, my wife Suzanne, without whose support this work would have been
unimaginable.
1 See Kevin Fee & Andres Viglucci, Gulf Coast: New Urbanism Foes of Sprawl Offer
Expertise in Rebuilding, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 11, 2005, at BU3, available at 2005
WLNR 16450877; Bradford McKee, To Restore or Reinvent?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2005,
at Fl; Jill Rosen, A New, Improved New Orleans Seen, BALT. SUN, Sept. 27, 2005, at IA;
Press Release, Cong. for the New Urbanism, Community, Character, and the Re-
sponse to Katrina (Sept. 17, 2005), http://www.cnu.org/news/index.cfm (follow
"Press Releases" hyperlink; then follow "Community, Character, and the Response to
Katrina" hyperlink).
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Urbanist principles and innovations into planning regulation, can and
should they use art to codify those principles?
In Part I, this Note provides an overview of art as law, discussing
both the traditional uses lawmakers have found for art and the more
novel uses that some New Urbanists propose or employ. In Part II,
this Note considers whether art can provide precise enough regula-
tions to satisfy constitutional due process and considers conditions
under which visual codes can do so. Finally, in Part III, this Note
turns to consider whether visual codes can effectively replace or en-
hance traditional verbal regulation, given the conditions that such
codes must satisfy.
This Note concludes that it is theoretically possible to use a wide
variety of images in legal codes, by constructing and interpreting them
in a way that constrains their meaning within the accepted require-
ments of due process. However, this Note goes on to conclude that
despite the capacity of images to function as law and some of the ben-
efits of such use, they have enough significant drawbacks that they
should only be used in situations where they are easy to interpret and
convey a very small amount of legal information-if any.
I. OVERVIEW OF ART AS LAW
The use of visual images as law, in the broadest sense, is hardly a
new proposition. For as long as maps have signified geographic
boundaries, some pictures have had legal effect.2 The European colo-
nial powers drew narrow lines on maps to divide vast holdings in
South America, Africa, and Asia, and these pictures determine the le-
gal borders of dozens of modern day states under the uti posseditis
regime. Zoning codes divide up municipalities by superimposing
colored shapes onto street maps, and the patchwork pages of those
codes constrain the use of private property with dramatic effects on its
value and its owners' legal rights.
A basic principle of New Urbanism is that "[t] he economic health
and harmonious evolution of neighborhoods . . . can be improved
through graphic urban design codes that serve as predictable guides
for change."3 No single paradigm represents the form of current and
2 Maps are not the only pictures that have traditionally been given legal effect,
but they are focused on here because of their close relationship to land use planning.
Patents frequently contain detailed diagrams of devices or processes protected, and
trademark protection granted to iconic logos gives them legal effect. An interesting
parallel to the discussion of interpreting legally effective pictures might be found in
the application of antidilution laws to trademarks.
3 Bill Lennertz, The Economic Health and Harmonious Evolution of Neighborhoods,
Districts, and Corridors Can Be Improved Through Graphic Urban Design Codes That Serve as
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proposed visual codes. Examples of regulations and codes employing
visual images range from radical to unremarkable. The development
code for an urban infill project in the Park East neighborhood of Mil-
waukee, while not entirely eliminating traditional regulatory text, de-
scribes its essential regulating plan in two pages consisting of an
introductory paragraph, a map, a series of images, and a handful of
labels. 4 Duany Plater-Zyberk & Co.'s (DPZ) evolving Smart Code, on
the other hand, retains much of the technical language traditional to
urban planning regulations and supplements that language with dia-
grams and pictures of proposed standards.
5
New Urbanist proposals to combine graphics and text in a simpli-
fied visual code do more than merely expand the scope of previous
uses of art in law. Such proposals are a response to the exclusivity,
waste, and conflict that riddle our current zoning codes and benefit
only the entrenched interests of the status quo-lawyers, in particu-
lar-at the expense of livable environments and integrated communi-
ties.6 The importance of images in codes to the New Urbanist vision
extends beyond its role in planning and development. Individual
ideas and proposals must be viewed within the larger context of what
New Urbanism seeks to achieve, which is to radically reorient the way
we build our communities and replace "a society of homogeneous
pieces, isolated from one another in often fortified enclaves, [with] a
society of diverse and memorable neighborhoods, organized into mu-
tually supportive towns, cities, and regions."7 In short, New Urbanism
seeks to help "untangle the mess we have made" of our cities, commu-
nities, and selves.
8
Images have an evocative force unmatched by conventional lin-
guistic codes. They are richer in meaning than words-they feel
closer to nature and offer viewers a more direct connection to the
objects they represent. New Urbanists know that they are fighting a
Predictable Guides for Change, in CHARTER OF THE NEW URBANISM 109, 109 (Michael
Leccese & Kathleen McCormick eds., 2000).
4 Milwaukee, Wis., Park East Redevelopment Plan: Development Code ch. 2
(une 15, 2004), available at http://www.mkedcd.org/parkeast.
5 DUANY PLATER-ZYBERK & Co., SMART CODE (version 7.0, 2005), available at
http://www.dpz.com/pdf/SmartCodeV7.0-6-06-05.pdf [hereinafter DPZ, SMART
CODE]; see also DuANY PLATER-ZYBERK & Co., THE LEXICON OF THE NEW URBANISM (ver-
sion 3.2, 2002) [hereinafter DPZ, LEXICON].
6 JAMES HOWARD KUNSTLER, HOME FROM NOWHERE: REMAKING OUR EvERYDAY
WORLD FOR THE 21sT CENTURY 147-49 (1996).
7 ANDRES DUANY ET AL., SUBURBAN NATION: THE RISE OF SPRAWL AND THE DECLINE
OF THE AMERICAN DREAM, at xiv (2000).
8 Id.
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war of ideas and understand the importance of controlling the lan-
guage in which that war is waged. According to John Dutton:
The Lexicon of the New Urbanism, written by DPZ, is among the most
grandiose attempts at restructuring the language and ideas of urban
development in recent decades .... But in aiming at a wholesale
restructuring of development patterns and representational tech-
niques, the Lexicon and codes presented by the New Urbanists are
confronting the tremendous inertia of existing conventions.
9
Given the strength of current land use planning conventions,
New Urbanists must "provid[e] assurances that separation of uses is
not the only way to guarantee orderly land uses." 10 Visual codes must
do more than just simplify the planning process. The proposal to re-
think the way codes express legal conceptions of neighborhoods,
towns, cities, and regions is inseparable from the proposal to rethink
those legal conceptions themselves. By "show[ing] a desired out-
come,"11 pictures can provide their viewers-experts and laypeople
alike-with a less mediated experience of not only the possibility of
rethinking our built environment, but also the superiority of the New
Urbanist vision. 12 Using images in codes places the rhetorical force of
those images at the center of the planning universe and will, so the
New Urbanists believe, wrest control of those codes from the clutches
of the entrenched bureaucracy that props up a rapidly failing system.
But regardless of the validity or feasibility of the New Urbanists'
ultimate objectives for revitalized communities, unless the images can
survive the inevitable constitutional challenges to their precision, they
cannot function as law.
II. CAN ART BE LAw?
Legal codes are propositions-they declare what the law is. To
have legal effect, an image must convey meaning in a manner precise
enough to describe the underlying proposition. The Fourteenth
Amendment forbids any State to "deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."13 The Supreme Court has held
9 JOHN A. DUTTON, NEW AMERICAN URBANIsM: RE-FORMING THE SUBURBAN ME-
TROPOLIS 81 (2000). See generally DPZ, LEXICON, supra note 5.
10 E-mail from Nicole Stelle Garnett, Lilly Endowment Associate Professor of Law,
Notre Dame Law School, to author (Jan. 19, 2006, 15:30:30 EST) (on file with
author).
11 KUNSTLER, supra note 6, at 148.
12 See DUTTON, supra note 9, at 75 ("Sometimes the rewriting of the codes is
presented as a rhetorical device for displaying the relative value of [New Urbanist
design principles) in general ....").
13 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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that "the first essential of due process of law" is that a statute not be so
vague that "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application."' 4 This Part begins by
describing the semiotic aspects of the semantic difficulties in pinpoint-
ing the meaning of iconic signs generally. 15 This Part then turns to
the question of whether, and how, pictorial codes can express proposi-
tions and proposes a theoretical basis on which images can be con-
structed and interpreted with legally sufficient precision. The final
subpart considers the potential effect of a nonlegal use of art in
codes-descriptive examples-on the precision of the accompanying
verbal text. Part II ultimately concludes that art, under certain limited
conditions, can be used in regulatory codes, either legally or nonle-
gally, without automatically violating the Due Process Clause.
A. Vagueness in Theory
The problem of vagueness 16 in pictorial codes arises from the way
in which pictures express meaning. Although semiotics-"the study
of signs and systems of signification" 7-is a broad field of study with
implications well beyond the essentially linguistic questions of what
legal codes look like, 18 two features of signs are particularly relevant to
the following analysis. First, a sign may be considered in terms of its
conventionality: the degree to which its meaning is assigned by human
convention as opposed to nature. Second, a distinction may be drawn
between analog and digital signs. 19
14 Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
15 Semantics, one of the traditional branches of linguistics, focuses on what words
mean in sentences, whereas semiotics, broadly defined as the study of signs, deals with
signs-including words-as individual units and is concerned with "how they mean."
JOHN STURROCK, STRUCTURALISM 22 (1986); Daniel Chandler, Semiotics for Begin-
ners: Introduction, http://www.aber.ac.uk/media/Documents/S4B/semOl.html (last
visited Jan. 19, 2006). Although there is much disagreement over semiotics' proper
scope of inquiry, for present purposes it is the mode of analysis, not the scope of
application, that is important.
16 The terms "vague" and "vagueness" are used in this Note in a general sense to
mean not precise enough to provide a standard to which a reasonably intelligent per-
son can conform. While, in linguistic terms, there is a difference between ambiguity
(equivocation) and vagueness (indeterminacy), most of what is referred to as vague-
ness refers to the equivocal nature of meaning expressed in images. See FREDERICK
BoWAERs, LINGUISTIC ASPECTS OF LEGISLATIVE ExPRESsION 131-36 (1989).
17 J.M. Balkin, The Hohfeldian Approach to Law and Semiotics, 44 U. MIAMI L. REv.
1119, 1119 (1990).
18 For examples of semiotic analysis applied to the study of law, see generally
ROBERTA KEVELSON, THE LAw AS A SYSTEM OF SIGNS (1988); Balkin, supra note 17.
19 A third major characteristic distinction among signs is the arbitrariness versus
the motivation of a signifier. Umberto Eco is critical of the frequent treatment as
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1. Conventionality
Semioticians, following Charles Sanders Peirce, divide the func-
tions of signs into three categories of decreasing conventionality: sym-
bols, icons, and indices. 20 Symbols, including language systems
whether spoken or written, are arbitrary and bear no resemblance to
the thing being signified. 21 Symbols are therefore purely conven-
tional: the relationship between the signifier and the referent are as-
signed by convention and must be learned by the user. In contrast,
icons, such as pictures, do resemble the signified thing: some of the
characteristics of icons are thus partially constrained by the referent
itself.22 Indices, which are of least relevance to the present discussion,
are signifiers that are directly connected to their referents and include
such signs as smoke (signifying fire), fever (signifying illness), and an-
alog clocks (signifying the passing of time) .23
synonyms of digital, arbitrary, and conventional, on the one hand, and analogical,
motivated, and natural on the other. UMBERTO Eco, A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS 190
(1976). To the extent that this analysis suffers from blending features of arbitrariness
into conventionality, it is probably a good example of his point.
20 Charles Sanders Peirce, Elements of Logic, in 2 COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES
SANDERS PEIRCE 2.247-.249 (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., 1965); Daniel
Chandler, Semiotics for Beginners: Signs, http://www.aber.ac.uk/media/Docu-
ments/S4B/sem02.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2006). It is important to note that while
signs are often referred to as symbols, icons, or indices, it is not particular signifiers
themselves that fall into these categories but rather their functions or, in other words,
the manner in which the signifier (symbol, picture, etc.) relates to the thing or con-
cept that it represents. TERENCE HAWKES, STRUCTURALISM AND SEMIOTICS 129 (1977).
A single sign can, and frequently does, fall into more than one classification.
21 Peirce, supra note 20, 2.249. The terminology of semiotics is not very stan-
dardized or always consistent. The term "sign" is generally used to refer to the entire
semiotic relationship: the object being represented (object, signified), the thing used
to represent the object (representamen, signifier), and the subject to whom the ob-
ject is represented (interpretant). Peirce himself, however, sometimes used the term
sign interchangeably with the term representamen. Id. 1 2.228; Chandler, supra note
20. For clarity, this Note uses the expressions "signifier" to refer to Peirce's
representamen, "referent" to refer to what he calls object, and "sign" to refer to the entire
relational construct.
22 Peirce, supra note 20, 2.247; Chandler, supra note 20. Icons, despite being
constrained by the referent, are still conventional to a greater or lesser extent. Take,
for example, stick figures frequently used to represent men and women: the picture is
iconic, but it does not actually resemble a man or a woman unless we have already
learned its meaning. Chandler, supra note 20 (citing Guy CooK, THE DISCOURSE OF
ADVERTISING 70 (1992)).
23 Peirce, supra note 20, 2.248. Photographs, at least on photographic film, are
also examples of indices in the sense that the way in which the photograph is created
depends upon a point-by-point relationship between the subject and the photograph.
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The natural character of icons explains some of their appeal for
community planners. Since pictures of what the code seeks to compel
actually resemble the final result envisioned, the visions of partici-
pants in the planning process are not obscured by the details of how
to accomplish them. For New Urbanists, who must seek to not only
design traditional communities, but also convince people to take part
in that design and ultimately live in the community, natural iconic
signs offer the added benefit of rhetorical strength. In part because
they are more "transparent" and thus more likely to be perceived as
true, iconic signs are certainly much more evocative than purely con-
ventional symbolic signs. 2 4 Our society retains a deep cultural connec-
tion to the "old-fashioned town," 25 and the ability of images to evoke
images of community and convenience is part of what makes New Ur-
banism so appealing.
On the other hand, less conventional iconic signs make it difficult
to achieve precise and stable meanings. Because linguistic codes are
entirely established by convention, the convention provides a lexical
constraint on each sign's meaning. The use of dictionaries and other
lexicons makes this process explicit: dictionaries find their definitions
in the way words are used and control the way those same words are
used going forward. In order for images to achieve meanings precise
enough to regulate conduct, their meaning must be constrained by
convention.
A theoretical method for accomplishing this is presented in Part
II.B.2, but first this Note will examine the analog character of iconic
signs, which both amplifies the appeal of images in codes and also
complicates the difficulty of achieving precise meaning.
2. Analog Versus Digital
Perhaps the most challenging theoretical obstacle to the use of
visual images in legal codes arises from the need for semantic preci-
sion in the interpretation and application of the law. A sign's-and
therefore the larger text that is built from many such signs-ability to
Id. 2.281. While photographs may be commonly employed in pictorial codes, their
important function in that context is iconic and not indexical.
24 Chandler, supra note 20. Of course, no icon is purely natural: even a photo-
graph of a building only resembles the building in certain ways, and it is partly
through convention that we determine how close the resemblance must be before the
icon is recognized as the signified object. See id.
25 So much so that we may be prone to create "hyperreality" by idealizing a past
that never really existed. See generally UMBERTO Eco, Travels in Hyperreality, in TRAVELS
IN HYPERREALITXy 3 (1986).
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express meaning in a semantically precise way is influenced by the
analogical or digital2 6 nature of the sign.
Whereas writing is digital, "involv[ing] discrete units such as
words and 'whole numbers' and depend [ing] on the categorization of
what is signified," 27 visual images operate analogically, expressing
meaning on a "graded . . .continuum." 28 Semioticians, including
Peirce, have contended that declarative propositions cannot be con-
veyed with images. 29 If this were absolutely true, there would be no
need to further explore the question of art as law, since laws must
declare what rights its subjects have and what they may or may not do.
However, such contentions may overstate the point, and film scholar
Bill Nichols explains the problem more helpfully:
The graded quality of analog codes may make them rich in
meaning but it also renders them somewhat impoverished in syntac-
tical complexity or semantic precision. By contrast the discrete
units of digital codes may be somewhat impoverished in meaning
but capable of much greater complexity or semantic significa-
tion .... This rich poverty, as it were, of analog codes leads to
problems, for it is often difficult to say what they mean .... 30
In other words, it is the very process of reducing the range of
meanings available from a sign that allows us to meaningfully use the
sign in precise communication. While the exact meaning intended
may be within an analog image's range of meanings, that meaning
cannot be effectively communicated without somehow isolating it, and
thus making it digital.
There are, of course analogical features to the written language-
writers and speakers constantly make use of the connotations of words
or phrases, which cannot be reduced to a single precise meaning.
However, what is available in digital symbolic language that is not
available to the more analogical icons is a relatively stable and precise
denotation,3 ' recorded in the pages of dictionaries or law reporters.
26 The use of the word "digital" in a scientific sense has become ubiquitous since
the introduction of digital methods of capturing and reproducing audio and video
information. This Note, following the conventions of semiotics, uses the word in a
broader sense to refer to any sign composed of discrete units with "intervening gap[s]
of non-sense," BILL NICHOLS, IDEOLOGY AND THE IMAGE 47 (1981), rather than con-
tinuity from one element to the next.
27 Chandler, supra note 20.
28 Id.
29 Peirce, supra note 20, 2.291 ("Icons and indices assert nothing.").
30 NICHOLS, supra note 26, at 47 (emphasis added); see also Chandler, supra note
20.
31 See NICHOLS, supra note 26, at 47 ("The distinction between denotation and
connotation found in digital codes like written language becomes indistinguishable
1602 [VOL. 81:4
2oo6] CODEX IMAGINARIUS 1603
If images are to bear any legal weight, there must be some way to
distinguish between an image's denotations and its connotations.
This Note next considers the possible ways in which visual codes
may be used as legal propositions with discrete elements and con-
strained by convention.
B. Pictures as Propositions
In order to function as stable propositions, pictures must be con-
strained by some sufficiently objective standard. This standard may be
explicit, contextual, or both.3 2 This subpart looks at three usages of
images in regulatory codes. The first section considers maps and dia-
grams, which are closest to a traditional use of images as law, although
New Urbanists are working to dramatically expand their use. The
next section considers the use of images to control aesthetic aspects of
land use and development. It examines in more detail the attractions
and problems of images as law discussed above and proposes a way in
which such pictorial aesthetic regulations could be created and inter-
preted to satisfy due process requirements. Finally, the last section
considers the use of graphic illustrations alongside more traditional
verbal regulations. Whereas the first two categories propose that
images can, under certain circumstances, be law, the last section con-
siders the use of images in codes but not as law.
1. Maps and Diagrams
It is clear that a zoning map, although pictorial and iconic, can
express specific legal propositions in conjunction with an explicit ref-
erence to a descriptive key-in other words, an explicit standard con-
straining the meaning of each significant aspect of the map. It is also
subject to a contextual constraint that limits the possible range of
colored overlays to those listed in the key and limits the meaning of
the conventional sign to the meaning specified in the key. If light
blue is light commercial and dark blue intense commercial, the zon-
ing map cannot use a shade of blue somewhere in the middle to spec-
[in images]."). Verbal language is obviously also susceptible to vagueness. Despite
the stability provided by lexical definitions of words, they are capable of multiple
meanings. The possible meanings of a given word, however, are constrained by a
common reference in a way that the meanings of an image are not.
32 In a sense, all lexical constraints depend on context, since the proper lexical
reference must be clear from context: the appearance of the word man in a German
text should not necessarily signify an adult male human being, and a stick-figure per-
son wearing a dress in an aboriginal culture is almost certainly not an invitation to a
woman to relieve herself.
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ify medium density commercial without explicitly defining the shade
in the key. Similarly, although green may be composed of yellow and
blue, the zoning map cannot be construed to imply that yellow (indus-
trial) and blue (commercial) are therefore permissible in any green
(residential) zone. Nor is it acceptable to assign priority to various
zones by reference to the color spectrum, with industrial being a
warmer color-whether that means better or worse-than residential,
which, in turn, is warmer than commercial. The point is that while
there is a wide range of meaning that can be given to colored zoning
overlays on a planning map, most of those meanings are excluded
from acquiring legal force by the operation of the key and context.
To the extent that diagrams in visual codes perform similar func-
tions in similar ways to zoning maps, their use seems relatively prob-
lem-free. For example, in the Park East plan, each block is
represented in a series of maps and diagrams that employ both anno-
tations and keys to specify precise setbacks, minimum and maximum
building heights, and various facade requirements. 33 Like zoning
maps, these diagrams are constrained by explicit reference to a lexi-
con, in this case the annotations and keys defining what particular
features of the visual code mean.
The diagrams indicating permissible building heights generally
consist of nothing more than abstract three-dimensional shapes, rep-
resenting buildings, with a dark band-often there are two distinct
shades within the same diagram-around the bottom of the exterior
face. While the shapes stand upon what is obviously a map and are
clearly recognizable as buildings in context, absent the key designat-
ing what the different shaded regions mean they would have no dis-
cernable meaning whatsoever.34 If the image specified only that it
related to building height, without providing a key to interpret the
shaded regions, there would still be no way to determine the intended
relationship between the shaded regions and between the buildings
and the rest of the image.
In order to provide a meaningful standard of guidance, each ele-
ment of the image must be specifically defined. For example, each
degree of shading must be given a single meaning. Despite the role it
may play in making the image easier to understand, the intuitive rela-
tionship between the shading-lighter shading indicating a greater
33 E.g., Milwaukee, Wis., Park East Redevlopment Plan: Development Code ch. 3,
at 14-15 (June 15, 2004), available at http://www.mkedcd.org/parkeast.
34 A first impression of the pictures might suggest a number of different mean-
ings that are unrelated to the height range actually signified, such as the proper pro-
portion of a building's base to the rest of the building or a requirement that the base
be clearly distinct from what is above.
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height-is of no legal significance. Dark grey is just as different from
medium grey as it is from light grey.
Although codes can use maps and diagrams to convey legally sig-
nificant information, there are other ways to get the same proposi-
tions across. Zoning divisions can be described in terms of the streets
or other physical features that form boundaries, 35 and diagrams indi-
cating street width, building height, or setback requirements can sim-
ply state the required minimums and maximums with reference to a
verbal description of the boundaries of the parcels to which the regu-
lation applies. Whether, and in what circumstances, it is efficient or
preferable to use such images in codes will be discussed in Part III.B. 1.
The principle illustrated here-that visual codes must be capable of
expression in purely verbal codes-is explored further in Part II.B.2
within the context of visual codes in aesthetic regulation.
2. Standards for Aesthetic Regulation
More difficult than the use of maps and diagrams in codes is the
use of images to regulate aesthetic features of land use and building
design.36 While aesthetic regulation is controversial, courts have gen-
erally found it a permissible exercise of the police power.3 7 Although
such regulation has been criticized as highly vague in expression, arbi-
trary in application, and troublingly limiting of free expression, 38
courts have, with more and more frequency, found that aesthetic
beauty can be a legitimate public good. 9
35 Even without physical boundaries it should still be possible, if more compli-
cated, to express zoning boundaries in terms of every parcel included in the zone.
36 Aesthetic regulation, also known as aesthetic zoning, includes at least "three
varieties of municipal regulation whose thrust is predominately aesthetic: sign regula-
tions, architectural review procedures, and historic preservation programs." ROBERT
C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 469-70 (3d ed. 2005).
37 See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994) (overturning municipal
statute that regulated the placement of signs within the respondent's house on First
Amendment grounds, but recognizing the legitimate government interest in aesthetic
regulation); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) ("The concept of the public
welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical,
aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine
that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy .... " (citing Day-Brite
Lighting v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 424 (1952))).
38 See John J. Costonis, Law and Aesthetics: A Critique and a Reformulation of the
Dilemmas, 80 MICH. L. REv. 355, 410-18 (1981).
39 See id. at 371-77.
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There are some limits upon a municipality's regulation in pursuit
of aesthetic beauty. The regulation may not be impermissibly vague,
40
must be applied nonarbitrarily, 41 and must avoid violating property
owners' and developers' First Amendment rights of expression.
42
These are, of course, requirements of all laws, but they take on some
unique complexity in the establishment and enforcement of aesthetic
standards. To begin with, more often than not reactions to beautiful
buildings and neighborhoods are gut reactions and difficult to ex-
plain. The inherently elusive gut reaction must be explained in a
manner precise enough to provide a meaningful standard of guidance
to a developer and yet flexible enough to burden free expression no
more than absolutely necessary to achieve the public good of aesthetic
beauty. In other words, aesthetic regulation must be precise, stable,
and flexible.
Images are a convenient way to express aesthetic preferences.
Since determining that a building is beautiful-or at least that we find
it to be so-is much easier than determining what precisely it is about
the building that makes it beautiful, the natural quality of images al-
lows the view to refer directly to the building without having to go
through the difficult process of describing it in conventional lan-
guage. 43 Our conceptions of beauty may rely more upon the relation-
ship of parts to the whole than upon the qualities of particular
elements in isolation. Beauty is hardly a digital concept, and it would
40 See Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) ("[A] statute which
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, vio-
lates the first essential of due process of law.").
41 See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (holding that
an ordinance must be "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial rela-
tion to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare" before it may be declared
unconstitutional (citing Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chi., 242 U.S. 526, 530-31
(1917);Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 30-31 (1905))).
42 The question of First Amendment limitations on aesthetic regulations is not
covered in detail in this Note. For a description and criticism of aesthetic regulation
as applied to the freedom of expression, see John Nivala, Constitutional Architecture:
The First Amendment and the Single Family House, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 291 (1996). See
also Costonis, supra note 38, at 411-13 (arguing that aesthetic measures premised
solely on visual beauty reasoning should not withstand the application of strict scru-
tiny); Kevin G. Gill, Note, Freedom of Speech and the Language of Architecture, 30 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 395 (2003) (arguing that municipal censure of architectural expression
violates the First Amendment).
43 The claim is not that conceptions of aesthetic beauty are themselves void of
conventional definition or that it does not vary with culture, only that the connection
between the referent that I find beautiful and the image that signifies it is not the
result of convention.
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be ridiculous to attempt to classify every building we see into the bi-
nary categories of "beautiful" and "not beautiful." Not only is there an
infinite range of possibilities between the two extremes, but the cate-
gories themselves also lack any definitive boundaries. 44 Additionally,
it is not always possible to judge, even subjectively, whether one build-
ing is more beautiful than another-I may find one building to be just
as beautiful as another, but in a different way. Because beauty is not a
digital concept, it resists expression in digital signs such as linguistic
codes. 45 The easier alternative is to use analog codes, such as images,
to express what is essentially an analog concept.
Yet the very features of images that make them a convenient
means of expressing aesthetic beauty also challenge their legal suffi-
ciency.46 As is the case with maps and diagrams,4 7 images must be
sufficiently constrained, either explicitly or contextually, to provide
clear and precise standards. The necessity of such standards, and
therefore of such constraints, in effect requires at least a significant
digitization of completely graded analog signs. While perfect specific-
ity is neither required nor possible, 48 "a statute which either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, violates the first essential of due process of law." 49
Iconic signs that lack any explicit or contextual constrains-or at
least relatively precise contextual constraints-are too vague to serve
as clear standards of guidance. In Anderson v. City of Issaquah,50 the
Washington Court of Appeals considered a constitutional challenge to
certain aesthetic building design requirements in the Issaquah Munic-
ipal Code. The code did not itself contain pictures meant to guide
44 This type of vagueness is what Bowers, following R.M. Kempson, terms "'inde-
terminacy of meaning.'" BowiEvs, supra note 16, at 135 (quoting R.M. KEMPSON, SE-
MANTIC THEORY 124 (1977)). Bowers lists two other primary types of vagueness, in
addition to ambiguity (which he distinguishes from vagueness): "'referential vague-
ness'" where the meaning is clear in principle but difficult to apply to some objects;
and "'lack of specification in the meaning of an item, where the meaning is clear but
is only generally specified.'" Id. (quoting KEMPSON, supra, at 124).
45 Of course, there have been many quite successful uses of conventional lan-
guage to express beauty, most notably through poetry. However, since a primary way
poetry achieves its effect is by deliberately making use of the analog properties of
language, it does not involve digitization in the same way that a legal code must.
46 See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
47 See supra Part II.B.1.
48 See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) ("Condemned to the
use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language.").
49 Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
50 851 P.2d 744 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
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developers but instead required compatibility with the existing build-
ings.51 The reference to the adjacent buildings, however, performed
the same function as the inclusion of photographs of those buildings
might have. The adjacent buildings and character of the area as a
whole were thus used as iconic signs with legal effect. The court held
that Issaquah's requirement was too vague, as it did "'not give effec-
tive or meaningful guidance' to applicants, to design professionals, or
to the public officials . . .responsible for enforcing the code."52
The deficiencies of the Issaquah Municipal Code can be de-
scribed according to the same constraint-criteria used to describe the
permissibility of maps. The code provided no lexicon with which to
"read" the design of adjacent buildings that was meant to constrain
the applicant's own design. It is difficult to imagine what form such a
lexicon would even take. Unlike a zoning map, where purely conven-
tional colored overlays are used to supplement the natural map and
give legal meaning to the area represented, it is not possible to overlay
actual buildings on a street with conventional symbols indicating the
meaning of particular design features. While it might have been pos-
sible for the city to create a list of specific attributes that it considered
characteristic of the street and therefore required for compatibility,
this would have, in effect, eliminated the need for any reference to
the iconic sign of the buildings, and replaced that reference with a
specific design code, which the city council apparently either did not
want or was unable to achieve.
53
51 Id. at 746. According to the court, Issaquah Municipal Code section
16.16.060(B) at the time provided, in part, that "'[b]uildings and structures shall be
made compatible with adjacent buildings of conflicting architectural styles"' and that
"'[h]armony in texture, lines, and masses shall be encouraged."' Id.
52 Id. at 751 (quoting Brief for Seattle Chapter of the American Institute of Archi-
tects et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellant, Anderson, 851 P.2d 744 (No. 29148-
3-1)). The court further explained that "neither [the plaintiff] nor the commissioners
may constitutionally be required or allowed to guess at the meaning of the code's
building design requirements by driving up and down Gilman Boulevard looking at
'good and bad' examples of what has been done with other buildings." Id. at 752.
53 Reinforcing the difficulty of expressing aesthetic preferences in specific, digital
language, the court quotes a Issaquah city council member:
"[M]aybe we haven't done a good job in ... communicating what kind
of image we want. We all want an image. I bet you if I stated my image it
would be certainly different from everyone of you here and everyone in the
audience.... [lIf we want a specific design, I agree with proponent's coun-
sel, and that is that we come up with a specific district design .... We don't
have such a design requirement. So we all have to rely on some gut feel.
And often times this gut feel gets us into trouble because it could be misin-
terpreted or misconstrued. .. "
Id. (alterations and omissions in original).
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Images used in codes, however, have significant benefits over ref-
erences to existing development. If it is difficult to conceive of a way
that a city could provide effective constraint on the meaning of "com-
pati[bility] with adjacent buildings '54 without providing a full-blown
design specification, this is a result of the complete lack of control
over the signs used to express the rule. Images on paper allow for
greater control and flexibility to, either implicitly or explicitly, limit
the range of possible meanings they can convey. First, a code could
limit the images it includes to specific examples of "good" and "bad"
designs, thus eliminating some of the guesswork that the court in An-
derson found so troubling. Second, the code could provide annota-
tions to the images indicating particular features that are considered
essential to compatibility and aesthetic beauty. Finally, in choosing
from a much broader range of compatible examples than would be
available in a particular neighborhood, those drafting the code can
create more specific contextual limitations. Properly used, this ap-
proach to visual coding may implicitly accomplish what the first two
limitations attempt to do explicitly.
The key feature of selecting a series of images to convey standards
of aesthetic beauty and compatibility is the list form that it takes. Lists
are often effectively employed in nonvisual codes to overcome
problems of vagueness. 55 Three important interpretive maxims that
apply to the construction of statutory lists are noscitur a sociis, ejusdem
generis, and expressio unius est exclusio alterius.56 Noscitur a sociis is de-
fined by one scholar as "a general rule of similarity whereby any word
in a series of words, usually of the same grammatical class, takes on
the semantic feature or features which all the other words have in
common; in expression, the series of words includes no higher super-
ordinate term. '57 Literally translated as "'it is known by its associ-
ates,'" 5 8 this maxim clearly operates as a contextual constraint on the
54 Id. at 746.
55 PETER M. TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE 81-85 (1999); see a/soJovan Brkic & Nor-
man Anderson, Drafting and Interpreting Legal Documents, in 2 LAw AND SEMIOTICS 87,
102 (Roberta Kevelson ed., 1988) ("Illustrative examples give greater precision to the
concept being defined without limiting the adaptability of the concept to unforeseen
possibilities or changing socio-cultural contexts.").
56 TIERSMA, supra note 55, at 83-84.
57 BowERs, supra note 16, at 119. Bowers includes the second part of the defini-
tion to distinguish noscitur a sociis from the related maxim ejusdem generis, which re-
quires a "higher superordinate term"-a term that explicitly defines the manner in
which the subordinate terms are used-to function. Id. This distinction, discussed in
Part 11.C, is central to understanding the difference between images used as indepen-
dent legal propositions and images used as illustrative examples.
58 BowERs, supra note 16, at 119.
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meaning of each word in the list. Although each of the listed terms
may have meanings not in common with the other terms, the legal
effect of these meanings can be excluded by reference to the other
terms.
59
Expressio unius and ejusdem generis have been described as specific
rules grouped underneath the "'broader linguistic rule"' of noscitur a
sociis.60 In lists, the principle of expressio unius "suggests that any simi-
lar item that the drafter could have included, was indeed included"
6'
and naturally applies to lists unless expressly disavowed. 62 Ejusdem
generis functions similarly to noscitur a sociis-both "limit the meaning
of a word within a particular class."463 They are distinct in two ways.
First, noscitur a sociis constitutes its class implicitly whereas ejusdem
generis obtains its reference by explicitly "using the other expression to
invite an inference of class."'64 Second, whereas ejusdem generis creates
an open list by using the general superordinate term, noscitur a sociis,
while not necessarily closed, invites the application of expressio unius
because it does not explicitly include an "other expression."
65
The "image-list" and accompanying interpretive principles must
perform a dual role in aesthetic regulation. The list must both define
which features are being regulated and also, for each regulated fea-
ture, indicate either the available or the excluded choices. In order to
be precise enough with respect to what is regulated and flexible
enough to allow for individual expression, the list should be struc-
tured in such a way as to apply noscitur a sociis and expressio unius to the
list of regulated features while applying ejusdem generis to the list of
available choices. In principle, this could be accomplished by includ-
ing a superordinate term that relates to the list of available choices,
and thus be open to a number of choices within each regulated cate-
gory, but no superordinate term that relates to the list of regulated
feature.
59 One of the possible problems with interpreting the language in Anderson was
that since the genus "adjacent buildings" included both "good and bad" examples,
there was no way to discover commonalities between them with respect to what the
commissioners considered appropriate for their "'signature street.'" Anderson, 851
P.2d at 752.
60 BowERS, supra note 16, at 119.
61 TIERSMA, supra note 55, at 83.
62 This disavowal has become very popular as a means of avoiding unwanted nar-
rowing interpretations. Id. at 85.
63 BowERs, supra note 16, at 119-20.





An example of a functional "image-list" is found in the Milwaukee
Park East Code.6 6 The code describes four different types of buildings
that can be used in three different combinations. The permissible
combinations for a particular block are defined by reference to a
map, 67 and further specifications governing height restrictions and
facade requirements are detailed in specific sections on each block.
68
The description of the building types includes only one general de-
scriptive work for each: "rowhouse," "slab," "core," and "large
venue." 69 Above each verbal descriptor is a simple block drawing, ap-
parently representing the general shape that each type must take. In
line with each descriptive term and drawing is a set of either two or
three photographs of real world instantiations of the general type in
question.
It is not clear from the illustration whether the verbal descriptor
and the highly general drawings are meant to be "higher superordi-
nate terms" or merely categorical labels that provide a symbolic "term"
that can be used to reference the corresponding genus. Normally, the
ejusdem generis rule applies "only where such 'general words' follow a
list of generically similar species. '70 Since the information is arranged
visually rather than semantically, it does not seem unreasonable to
read the listed images as examples limiting the general term rather
than defining it.7 1 Reading it as a definition may leave us with the
proposition that a row house, as far as the code is concerned, means
the two row house pictures, and no others, when what we really want
to say is that the two row houses pictured are permitted, along with
any other row house. Since there is no superordinate term for the
genus of features regulated and there is no express disavowal of the
expressio unius principle, the second general proposition can be read
to mean that only those features which are common are regulated.
Assuming here that the image-list is meant to stand on its own as an
aesthetic regulation, 72 the images in each series can be "read" against
66 Milwaukee, Wis., Park East Redevelopment Plan: Development Code ch. 2
(June 15, 2004), available at http://www.mkedcd.org/parkeast/.
67 Id.
68 Id. ch. 3, at 12-78.
69 Id. ch. 2.
70 Box qxs, supra note 16, at 121.
71 In other words, the "sentence" can be read "row house: (imagel, image2),"
rather than "row house = (imagel, image2)."
72 One of the problems with the Park East Code is the lack of specificity as to
what parts of the code are meant to regulate particular aspects of development, such
as aesthetic details. As a whole, the code clearly intends to regulate aesthetics, see
Milwaukee, Wis., Park East Redevelopment Plan: Development Code ch. 1, at 5-9, but
the Regulating Plan in Chapter Two is not specific as to what it regulates. It reads:
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each other to extract the common elements. While the application of
noscitur a sociis is somewhat limited by the shortness of each list, partic-
ularly where only two images are used, 73 some precision is added by
the juxtaposition of the images. In the case of the "core" genus, the
three images reveal several commonalities: all three pictured build-
ings are at least half-again as tall as they are wide; all of the openings,
whether windows or balconies, are vertically aligned; all three have
rectangular bases; and all are set back no more than sidewalk distance
from the street.7
4
Although such commonalities may not always be readily appar-
ent, they are at least constrained by their context. As the range of
meaning of the images becomes more constrained, they lose more
and more of the analog character that makes them attractive in the
first place. Once the meaning of an image, or feature thereof, be-
comes sufficiently digital to escape the vagueness problem inherent to
analog signs, it becomes stable and precise. The stability and preci-
sion, in turn, allow the image to be translated into a verbal statement
representing the same proposition. Thus, the threshold question for
whether an image is sufficiently constrained in meaning to serve as a
constitutionally permissible legal rule can be reduced to the question
of whether the legal meaning conveyed by the image can be equiva-
lently expressed verbally.
C. Nonlegal Illustrations
The use of visual images in codes as illustrative examples accom-
panying a more traditional word-based text presents its own separate,
The Regulating Plan controls the overall form of streets, blocks and
buildings to create the physical character envisioned in the Master Plan.
Four building types ... are grouped in three different combinations. Each
block is coded to indicate the combination of building types allowed....
Id. ch. 2. It is vague whether "overall form" and "physical character" are meant to
include aesthetic considerations specific to the building facade and design; but, since
this vagueness does not arise from the use of images per se, I choose to read the code
in a way that best suits my illustration.
73 Id. ch. 2; see BowERs, supra note 16, at 121 (recognizing that "only two words
are necessary for noscitur a sociis to operate," but stressing that "its operation is all the
safer for having more words than two in the list").
74 Milwaukee, Wis., Park East Redevelopment Plan: Development Code ch. 2. In-
terestingly, the third picture of a "core" building does not have a discernable base,
middle, and top, which is not consonant with the general rules and definitions found
earlier in the code. Id. ch. 1, at 6. This should not technically be a problem, since the
presence of this feature in the other images prevents the absence from becoming a
common character of the genus. However, it seems rather confusing to include
within the code images of buildings that do not themselves conform to the code.
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albeit related, questions and complications. While, at first blush, the
vagueness seems alleviated by the presence of the traditional text, the
question of the interpretive significance of the examples remains. In
order to remain nonlegal, and thus escape the constitutional con-
straints on vagueness, the images must be illustrations of possibilities
rather than of meaning. In other words, visual examples in the legal
sense described above tell the developer what is required, whereas vis-
ual examples without legal significance can simply say what is possible.
On the one hand, the combination of precise language and illus-
trative examples may increase the accessibility of the code and convey
aspirational and emotional meaning without losing the precision nec-
essary for legal regulation. This feature of illustrative examples is par-
ticularly salient in the context of aesthetic architectural regulation.
The process of designing a new building or block consonant with a
series of examples is fundamentally a work of analogy: the developer
can conform her plans to the precise legal requirements while at the
same time freely interpreting the aspirational content of the iconic
signs. The operation of analogy in this case provides a maximum
amount of flexibility while still guiding, but not constraining, the in-
terpretive freedom of the designer by suggesting a proportional rela-
tionship to the original example.
On the other hand, the precise interpretive relationship of the
illustrative examples to the legal text can be difficult to predict and
can cause uncertainty in the drafting process.75 The drafter of a con-
tract or law loses control over the interpretation of its language once it
acquires legal effect. While the problem is less acute in local govern-
ment regulation, since a municipal body will get the first crack at im-
plementing regulations, the courts still loom as the final arbiter of
legal meaning, especially where the law is too vague to provide mean-
ingful constraint on local regulatory discretion.
75 Attorneys involved in an attempt to create an informative and comprehensible,
yet legally effective, construction contract described their dilemma over the inclusion
of diagrams:
There were legal concerns that [the diagrams] may be taken as a substitute
for the text rather than as a guide to it; and that they may create representa-
tions not intended in the text.
This seems to be a fundamental problem with explanatory material of
any kind in a legal document. It is a particularly acute one when the expla-
nations provide so much information that they threaten the primacy of the
text.
David More & Michle Asprey, Construction, Deconstruction, Reconstruction: Co-operative
Contracting and the C21 Construction Contract, CuARITy, May 1999, at 8, 10.
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If the examples are not to serve a legal purpose, and thus escape
the due process constraints on vagueness, they must help us under-
stand what is already a sufficiently precise regulation, without adding
to, modifying, or limiting the legal meaning in any way. But a series of
images help us to understand the meaning of a general term in pre-
cisely the same way that they constrain the legal meaning of the super-
ordinate term in the operation of the ejusdem generis principle. In the
former case, the legal significance of the illustrations is explicitly re-
jected; in the latter it is relied upon to prevent the regulation from
violating due process requirements. The relationships of similarity be-
tween the images not only allow lexical constraint of their meaning in
context, but also intuitively encourage it. In the case of purely extrale-
gal illustrative examples, the verbal regulation being illustrated must
itself be sufficiently precise. If, however, the verbal regulation is too
indeterminate, the interpreter may look at the regulation in context
to determine the legislative intent and insufficiently constrained visual
examples will not save the regulation. Furthermore, there is a danger
that even if the regulation is sufficiently precise to satisfy due process
it may be yet further refined by the image-list; the presence of a list
may push the interpreter to view the verbal regulation more generally
and the image-list as limiting rather than illustrating the legal
meaning.
If graphic illustrations are used carefully, they should be able to
stand next to the text without requiring a semantically precise image-
list and without interfering with the interpretation of the verbal regu-
lations. Such careful implementations should include an unequivocal
disclaimer of any legal effect or regulatory intent. Additionally, be-
cause the limiting effect of the ejusdem generis principle requires two or
more examples of the general type, using only a single illustration to
convey the desired ideological and emotive message will help reject
any implication of legal significance.
In the final Part of the analysis, below, this Note considers some
of the benefits, limitations, costs, and complications that may arise
from adoption of visual codes.
III. CAN ART BE GOOD LAw?
Even if art can be law, at least in the limited sense outlined above,
there remains the question of whether it would be wise or efficient to
replace or augment current development codes with visual images.
What would be the benefits of such a move? What would be the costs?
Given the limitations of such expression-both inherent and constitu-
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tionally required-would pictures in codes even accomplish the tasks
imagined by their advocates?
James Howard Kunstler suggests three problems with current
code drafting that creating simplified, visual codes might help solve:
the exclusivity of the drafting process, the comprehensibility and ac-
cessibility of the resultant code, and the prohibitive cost of the lawyers
and experts required to explain and implement the code. 76 The anal-
ysis that follows considers the impact of using pictures on the creation,
implementation, and interpretation of urban planning codes, both in
terms of the relative effectiveness in achieving Kunstler's goals and the
costs and benefits to municipal land use.
A. Creation
It is at the creation stage that visual codes perhaps have their
greatest appeal. Under the land use planning systems currently domi-
nating, Kunstler's jaded, if realistic, view of the process includes: a
closed, exclusive plan development; the formalization of a typically
unimaginative plan into a legal code comprehensible only to lawyers;
and finally a windfall to lawyers who charge to create a legal code that
no one can understand and then again to interpret that legal code to
any parties involved in the development.
77
1. Visual Codes and Collaborative Planning
The dominance of legal language, and therefore lawyers, over the
process of lawmaking and planning has been criticized on numerous
grounds, including the resultant exclusionary power structure 78 and
76 KUNSTLER, supra note 6, at 148.
77 Id.
78 For example, one commentator contends that
[a]s soon as an agreement between citizens becomes a contract, its lan-
guage moves from the authority of the persons involved to that of the state.
Lawyers pore over it, certainly not to clarify it in the minds of the contrac-
tors, but to make it conform to the state's interests....
Lawyers, "keepers of arguments" as Auden wrote, are also keepers of
power. If power corrupts, it corrupts language and uses it for its own
purposes. ...
... If it is important that more people be able to read and understand
legal documents, is it because such understanding will give them more ac-
cess to power or because it will align their interests more closely with those
of the state?
William H. DuBay, Letter to the Editor, Deconstructing Legal Language, CLARITY, May
1999, at 59, 59.
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loss of immediacy to the lay citizen. 79 The general incomprehensibil-
ity of planning agreements and codes, combined with the limited pub-
lic participation available in most land use planning,8 0 places the
citizen on the outside looking in. Collaborative approaches to land
use planning, such as that suggested by Professor Alejandro Cama-
cho, 81 may go a long way toward curing the procedural problems of
limited public participation, but the problem of the accessibility of
code language remains. If the content of the collaborative parties'
vision must be translated into complicated legal and technical plans,
then the parties lose their control over the vision. If the forum re-
quires a legal or technical sophistication greater than most lay citizens
have, it may require significant resources on the citizens' part in order
to participate.
Visual codes would not, by themselves, bring about the broad-
based participation in planning that many, including New Urbanists,
envision. What the use of such codes may provide, however, is a
means of overcoming the information and resource gap likely to arise
in collaborative methods of land use planning.8 2 Even where informa-
tion is made available to the public prior to collaboration, the incom-
79 John Lachs argues that
the loss of immediacy in the legal system.... has now become so significant
that it endangers . . . the public acceptance of law as a democratic
institution.
Mediation shatters the world into varied centers of competence. Exclu-
sive expertise in a field involves the development of special standards and
procedures. Even where exclusiveness is not a primary aim, outsiders are
naturally shut out ....
John Lachs, Law and the Importance of Feelings, in 2 LAW AND SEMIOTICS, supra note 55,
at 221, 225.
80 Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative Model
for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions
(pt. 1), 24 STAN. ENVrL. LJ. 3, 36-45 (2005).
81 Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative Model
for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions
(pt. 2), 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 269, 273-303 (2005).
82 In his proposal of a collaborative method of planning, Camacho recognizes
that such information and resource gaps exist, and even that "collaborative processes
can be more resource and information intensive than their conventional counter-
parts," id. at 315 (citingJody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and
the Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVrL. L.J. 60, 123 (2000)), but argues that "because
the collaborative model facilitates adaptive management of the regulatory process it-
self through experimentation, evaluation, and revision, collaborative processes should
become more inclusive over time," id. at 316.
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prehensibility,8 3 and thus inaccessibility, of much of the information
prevents it from meaningfully closing the gap between specialist and
lay participants. Information gaps in turn tend to become resource
gaps, as the need for extra mediating specialists to translate and ex-
plain the complex regulatory language increases the cost of participa-
tion in the collaborative forum. Because the visual images created
and discussed in the collaborative process are more natural and less
conventional,8 4 participants do not need to have command of the
conventions and expertise upon which traditional development codes
are based. This, in turn, reduces the resource costs of participation in
the collaborative process. An interested party could simply show up at
a planning session and, in theory, become immediately familiar with
the proposed process and results without the costly need to waste time
attempting to understand needlessly confusing and complex
proposals.
Whether collaborative planning takes the form of the New Ur-
banist charrette8 5 or a more formalized process, the hope of New
Urbanists is that if people "can see what they're talking about" it will
"elevate [ ] the quality of public discussion about development. '8 6 The
virtues of the elevated participation facilitated are dual. First, partici-
pation fosters better site-specific development by enabling all inter-
ested parties to provide concrete feedback in language that citizens,
developers, local government, and architects can all understand. 87
Second, public participation and accessible expressions of develop-
ment plans serve a broader didactic purpose. Participants in planning
learn about "the costs of current zoning and development policies
and the advantages of change." 88 Enhanced participation thus not
only facilitates greater consensus in the development of site-specific
plans, it also strengthens the broader community through education
and, by providing a more direct interaction with the development pro-
cess, empowerment.
83 KUNSTLER, supra note 6, at 148 ("Zoning codes are invariably 27-inch-high
stacks of numbers and legalistic bullshit that few people but technical specialists
understand.").
84 See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
85 For a description of the charrette process, see Nat'l Charrette Inst., What Is a
Charrette?, http://www.charretteinstitute.org/charrette.html (last visited Jan. 19,
2005). See also DUANY ET AL., supra note 7, at 226-27 (describing and advocating for
public participation in the planning process); KUNSTLER, supra note 6, at 147 (describ-
ing the charrette as a "democratic process" that will allow transition away from tradi-
tional zoning without tearing society apart in the process).
86 KUNSTLER, supra note 6, at 148.
87 GERALD E. FRUtG, CITY MAKING 162 (1999).
88 Id.
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2. Limitations and Concerns
While visual codes, as part of a larger collaborative scheme of de-
velopment planning, do indeed have the potential to foster both
greater participation and consensus among all interested parties, it is
important to note the limitations and caveats to the use of such codes.
First, visual codes are limited in that they cannot overcome all of the
challenges to collaborative land use development. Second, the partic-
ipation-enhancing benefits of visual codes depend upon implementa-
tion within a broader collaborative framework.
Inherent in the first limitation is the risk of oversimplification.
While the planning process often involves needless complexity in the
form of long, virtually incomprehensible zoning ordinances and de-
velopment agreements, the process is nevertheless inherently com-
plex. Visual codes might overcome some of the information gap in
collaborative planning by clearly presenting and developing intended
results and providing an intuitive justification of how particular
choices are required in view of those results. However, can such codes
incorporate and explain the complex environmental, sociological,
and market factors that must play an important role in determining
both the plan's permissibility within the larger regulatory context and
the prospects for long-term success?
A well crafted collaborative process would certainly include the
expertise necessary to consider and implement environmental guide-
lines. However, the technical nature of the relevant scientific infor-
mation is not capable of visual expression in the same way that
aesthetic and functional questions may be. Significant aspects of the
planning discussion would thus remain subject to the information and
resource gaps that collaborative methods of land use planning entail.
Furthermore, because of the complex regulatory scheme to which
land use decisions with environmental impacts may be subject, the
possibility of achieving a compact, comprehensive, and final plan
within a reasonably limited amount of time is diminished. 9
Similarly, although sociological and market concerns relating to
the success of the proposed plan should find a voice in any well de-
signed collaborative forum, the factors that influence residential and
commercial investment, as well as the sustained success of planned
development, are complex and do not lend themselves to simple vis-
89 Since aspects of the proposed code will need to be subjected to multiple levels
of review and revision in nonparticipatory processes, the promise of participant-con-
trolled content is challenged. While this phenomenon is theoretically common to all
collaborative planning proposals, see infra Part III.C for a discussion of how the use of
visual codes, in particular, might complicate this process.
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ual explanation. While not necessarily subject to the same regulatory
control and revision as environmental issues, this complexity does
challenge the information and resource equality envisioned by cham-
pions of collaborative planning and simplification through visual
codes.
Secondly, a mere shift in the dominant manner of expression
from lawyers' English to architects' renderings might simply shift the
power to create, control, and interpret planning codes from one privi-
leged group to another.90 While the content of the code, and, at least,
its underlying aesthetic vision for development, might be more readily
apparent to lay citizens, the creation-process would be no less medi-
ated by virtue of the use of different types of signs to convey that con-
tent. To the extent that visual codes are developed outside of a
participatory process or constrain that process, they have the potential
to undermine the collaborative enterprise.
Within the context of visual codes as a feature of the broader New
Urbanist proposal, it is important to recall that New Urbanism is not
primarily focused on procedural reform in a narrow sense. At its core,
New Urbanism consists of a series of substantive proposals designed to
"reestablish [ ] ... mixed-use, livable communities; and evolve a design
philosophy that is capable of accommodating modern institutions
without sacrificing human scale and memorable places."9 1 Despite
the nobility, intuitive appeal, and pedigree of this traditionalist vision
of revitalized neighborhoods and community-centered life,92 the dis-
astrous consequences of the twentieth century's failed "urban re-
newal" projects caution against investing too heavily in the particular
visions of city planners and dreamers, regardless of their intentions.
90 See DUTTON, supra note 9, at 150 ("The Lexicon [ of the New Urbanism] has been
critiqued for its essentialism as well as its hubris in defining 'appropriate' urban vo-
cabularv and sanctioning 'correct' forms of urbanism.").
91 PETER CALTHORPE, THE NEXT AMERICAN METROPOLIS: ECOLOGY, COMMUNITV,
AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 17 (1993). Gerald Frug notes six design aspects that New
Urbanists focus on: "creating multiuse environments, constructing grid systems for
public streets, giving priority to the needs of pedestrians, facilitating reliance on pub-
lic transportation, highlighting the importance of centrally located public space, and
establishing focal points and boundaries for urban space." FRUG, supra note 87, at
150-51.
92 For example, many substantially similar arguments regarding the health of cit-
ies and city life could already be found inJANEJACOBS, THE DEATH- AND LIFE OF GREAT
AMERICAN CITIES (1961).
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B. Administration
The perceived benefits of pictorial codes to the administration of
town planning and land use stem from both the increased compre-
hensibility of such codes and, in Kunstler's words, their ability to
"show a desired outcome at the same time they depict formal specifi-
cations."93 If all the parties involved in development decisions regu-
lated by the code can understand the code without translation or
explanation, it will reduce the process's current dependence on spe-
cialists and lawyers. If the code is easier to understand, the processes
required to interpret and implement the code can be significantly
simplified.
1. Zoning Codes and Town Planning
While pictures in codes may do their part to reduce the complex-
ity and increase understanding of the code requirements, the effective
use of pictures itself depends on a system of land use regulation quite
a bit simpler than our current zoning laws. In other words, the cur-
rent complexity of zoning codes is in large part a response to the com-
plexity of our current land use and planning system.
In order to understand the reasons for this, it is helpful to look a
bit more objectively at "the reams of balderdash found in zoning
codes."94 The South Bend, Indiana Zoning Ordinance, 95 which is sev-
eral hundred pages in length, specifies sixteen different zoning dis-
tricts, classified into three general types of districts, each with its own
general regulations,96 and two special types of districts; 97 regulates
landscaping, lighting, signs, loading, and parking;98 provides special
regulations for certain specific uses;9 9 creates an administrative 10 0 and
enforcement structure; 10 ' and finally provides definitions for many of
the terms found in the ordinance. 10 2 The current system, which pro-
hibits uses in districts unless they are explicitly allowed for in the zon-
ing code, requires a long, complicated code in order to specify what is
permitted. Add to this already substantial stack of paper conditions
93 KUNSTLER, supra note 6, at 148.
94 Id.
95 SOUTH BEND, IND., ZONING ORDINANCE ch. 21 (2005).
96 Id. §§ 21-02.01 to -04.11.
97 Id. §§ 21-05 to -06.02.
98 Id. §§ 21-07.01 to -07.05.
99 Id. §§ 21-08.01 to -08.02.
100 Id. §§ 21-09.01 to -09.05.
101 Id. § 21-10.
102 Id. §§ 21-11.01 to -11.02.
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for variances, conditional uses, special permits, ad hoc zoning amend-
ments, and an administrative structure to manage the entire thing,
and pretty soon you have a "27-inch-high stack[ ] of numbers and le-
galistic bullshit"'0 3 sitting in front of you to which you must somehow
conform your development.
Simplifying the entire system, which the New Urbanists propose
to do, in part, by switching to a density-driven system where most uses
are permitted unless explicitly excluded, 10 4 would probably go a long
way towards simplifying land use codes. But what does moving away
from verbal codes and towards more visual codes add to this simplifi-
cation? Certainly, regulations of the built environment such as build-
ing size, street width, lighting, setback, and street-level facade
characteristics are easier to express in pictures than permissible uses,
but are they really more effectively expressed in pictures than with
verbal descriptions?
The "exemplary town planning code," 105 designed by Andres
Duany, Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, and others, and characterized by
Kunstler as much better than current codes, has gradually developed
into the DPZ Smart Code and grown to sixty-three pages.' 0 6 While this
is considerably shorter than most zoning codes, it may not be that
much easier to follow. The extensive use of tables, grids, and draw-
ings-some annotated and some juxtaposed with verbal descrip-
tions-compresses much more information onto each page than a
standard list-based verbal code. While simple graphics may be easier
to understand than lengthy verbal descriptions, simple pictures and
diagrams with little annotation cannot adequately convey the com-
plexity required by town planning. The more the graphics become
too technically detailed, either by annotation or reference to an inter-
pretive key, the more they lose the appeal of simplicity. Furthermore,
it is possible that pictures and diagrams may be more difficult to under-
103 KUNSTLER, supra note 6, at 148.
104 See Milwaukee, Wis., Park East Redevlopment Plan: Development Code ch. 1,
at 5-9 (June 15, 2004), available at http://www.mkedcd.org/parkeast. On the other
hand, many New Urbanists want to require mixed-uses, which obviously entails prohib-
iting certain uses once a certain maximum number occur. See CALTHORPE, supra note
91, at 63 (listing the preferred "minimum amount of public, core commercial and
residential uses"); DUAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 248 (concluding that lots should be
.zoned not by use but by compatibility of building type"); FRUG, supra note 87, at 151
("New urbanists want to replace current zoning laws .. .with laws that require the
reintegration of commercial, work, and home life.").
105 KUNSTLER, supra note 6, at 148; see AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, RAMSEY/SLEEPER
ARCHITECTURAL GRAPHIC STANDARDS 82-99 (John Ray Hoke, Jr. ed., 10th ed. 2000)
(presenting design guidelines prepared by Duany, Plater-Zyberk, and others).
106 See DPZ, SMART CODE, supra note 5.
2oo6] 1621
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
stand if oversaturated with technical information by causing informa-
tion overload. Take, for example, a graphical table detailing
"Vehicular Lane Assemblies" in the Smart Code.10 7 The table consists
of twenty-eight different block diagrams classified horizontally into
two categories-one-way and two-way movement-and vertically into
six different street-parking categories. Within the table cell is a dia-
gram representing the street lanes and parked vehicles, annotated
with required street widths and directional arrows, labels designating
within which transect zone each street configuration is permitted,
and, in small text underneath each diagram, technical information
specifying the appropriate average daily traffic, pedestrian crossing,
and speed limit for each section. The inclusion of this much informa-
tion on a single page may be an efficient use of paper, but it does not
seem either to be more user-friendly to nonspecialists or to "show a
desired outcome."10 8
The point here is not to single out specific aspects of one sug-
gested visual code for criticism or to suggest that pictures and dia-
grams can never be used effectively in land use regulation and
planning. The Smart Code contains effective, as well as ineffective, uses
of pictures and diagrams, both for nonlegal illustrative purposes and
for technical specifications. Additionally, it is relatively new and will
doubtless improve over time as local governments attempt to imple-
ment it. What is suggested is that pictures and diagrams have a cer-
tain limit to the amount of information they can convey effectively,
beyond which they become just as-and quite possibly more-inacces-
sible as their verbal equivalents. Where the information conveyed is
limited and the images have a natural connection to the function they
perform, pictures may covey the information just as well or better than
words and also keep the desired outcome from being obscured in the
translation into hundreds of words of legal code. As noted above, the
use of maps to divide a region into sections is far easier to understand
than an equivalent detailed verbal description of the boundaries of
each section. 0 9 Other less traditional applications should be com-
pared in terms of their functions to the map, as a central case of what
is and is not efficient in visual coding.
2. Aesthetic Regulations
Similar difficulties arise with the use of drawings or photographs
to regulate the aesthetic features of development. If the regulation
107 Id. tbl.3B.
108 KUNSTLER, supra note 6, at 148.
109 See supra Part II.B.I1.
1622 [VOL. 81:4
2oo6] CODEX IMAGINARIUS 1623
employs the image-list approach described in Part II.B.2, the aesthetic
aspects that each list is meant to regulate must be very limited in num-
ber and complexity. If a single image-list attempts to regulate too
many features, if the features regulated are themselves composed of
too many detailed subfeatures or specifications, or if a relatively large
number of images are used to express the complex regulation, at least
two issues arise.
First, there is the difficulty of image selection. When all that is
required is a relatively few commonalities between images, it will not
be difficult to find examples with which to build the list. In cases like
the Park East Code discussed above, 1 10 finding examples of buildings
satisfying the correct proportions, openings-alignment, and street-face
should require nothing more than a camera and a plane ticket to any
major American city. However, the task would be more difficult if the
image-list were used to describe not only these features, but also the
appropriate use of balconies, the proportion of the base to the rest of
the building, materials used in facades, and any number of other aes-
thetic characteristics. Added to the difficulty of finding a series of
images that all contain the desired commonalities is the necessity of
finding images that share all the desired qualities but no others. Since it
is the commonalities that define the meaning of what is being regu-
lated, unanticipated commonalities will acquire the same legal force
as intended commonalities. Those who create the regulation will
know what was intended, but neither regulated parties who did not
participate in the creation process nor successor local authorities will
be able to tell the difference. While it may be possible in many in-
stances to find the proper images to convey the precise meaning in-
tended by the regulation, the difficulty of construction casts the
efficiency of the notion into doubt. It may often end up being much
easier simply to verbalize the aesthetic objective.
Second, the problem of visual information overload may occur in
the same way here as with overly annotated and complex diagrams
and pictures. This may happen both in the case of a single overly
complex image-list, as well as in that of a large number of simpler lists.
When attempting to extract the intentional meaning of a complex im-
age, certain features will be more prominent than others, either by
virtue of their character or the similarity between images. Trying to
find more subtle commonalities, and then trying to retain those com-
monalities while finding further ones, may prove to be more than
most nonspecialists can accomplish easily. Where many relatively sim-
ple image-lists are used to convey the same complex meaning, the dif-
110 See supra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
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ficulty is that the vast amount of resulting images will overload the
reader's senses and cause confusion. The reader may carry over com-
monalities from previous image-lists or blend multiple images in her
mind and thus obscure a clear understanding of the intentional
meaning of each image-list regulation. In both cases, the reader may
be presented with too much information in an unstructured way; the
images, either individually or taken as a whole, may contain too much
information to be easily assimilated, even where the intended mean-
ing has been constrained enough to make interpretation possible.
C. Interpretation
New Urbanists hope that visual codes, when combined with a col-
laborative approach to planning which includes broad participation,
can help achieve a less adversarial process of development than the
current planning model produces.11' Even if general consensus be-
tween all presently interested parties is somehow reached, it is likely
that some will find it less costly or more profitable to skirt the system.
There will also almost certainly be loopholes to exploit and corners to
cut. Beyond that there are the inevitable changes caused by the pass-
ing of time. Old developers will leave and new ones will take their
place. Positions of authority will change hands. New problems will
arise that call for imaginative solutions that some will champion and
others will resist. Whatever the cause, disputes will eventually arise,
and the parties will seek a definitive interpretation of the rules.
The early stages in the dispute process can be handled adminis-
tratively, and architects and urban planners, expert in deciphering
complicated the visual codes, 11 2 can be given the task of interpreting
and explaining the code to the disputing parties. Since, at least in this
government system, there is no "architect king" entrusted with un-
checked interpretive authority, we must, fortunately, rely on the
courts to review local administrative decisions. While the level of def-
erence given to local authorities in interpreting their own regulatory
codes is typically very high, the court must be satisfied that the stan-
dard applied is neither impermissibly vague nor applied in an arbi-
trary manner. The court must therefore interpret the regulation
111 KUNSTLER, supra note 6, at 149 ("Because citizens have not been happy with the
model of development that zoning gives them, they have turned it into an adversarial
process.").
112 And who, apparently, unlike lawyers and traffic engineers, are completely pub-
lic-minded and would not dream of "profit[ing] financially by being the sole arbiters
of the regulations." Id. at 148.
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itself, if only to confirm that the local authorities' interpretation and
application are reasonable.
As discussed above, it is possible to construct a code carefully us-
ing visual images such that the regulatory proposition of the image is
constrained enough to be translated into a verbal statement. 11 3
Where the visual regulations are simple and easily verbalized, such as
maps, diagrams, and possibly very simple image-lists, the court's task
would not be daunting. However, if the meaning of the visual regula-
tion is clear, the dispute is less likely to reach the court in the first
place.
In interpreting a more complex visual regulation, there are dif-
ferent possible ways the court could, grudgingly,' 14 proceed. First, the
court could perform the interpretation without verbalizing its transla-
tion if it finds that the regulation was sufficiently clear and applied
nonarbitrarily. The losing party, however, is unlikely to be satisfied
with such an approach, since she cannot follow the reasoning of the
court. Second, the court could require the regulatory authority to
submit its own verbal translation of the regulation, which the court
could approve or find wanting. This would at least allow the court to
express why it accepts or rejects the proposed verbalization and
whether it finds the application of the verbalized regulation arbitrary
or not. However, the requirement that the regulatory authority ex-
press the regulation verbally would seemingly negate whatever per-
ceived efficiency prompted the adoption of a visual code in the first
place: the regulator would effectively be promulgating a parallel
code-and thereby incurring many of the associated costs-that could
be used instead of the visual code. Finally, the court could verbalize
its own interpretation and determine whether the administrative au-
thority properly applied its discretion under that interpretation. This
approach has similar problems to the second. The court's verbaliza-
tion would become a parallel and binding expression of the legal pro-
position, since the verbalization would be part of the court's
precedent. In addition to incurring the costs of effectively administer-
ing two parallel, redundant codes, the courts particular verbalization
would constrain the regulatory authority, causing it to lose a measure
of its discretion.
113 See supra Part lI.B.
114 It seems unlikely that a court would relish the task of pouring over lists of
images to determine their commonalities. Judges are, after all, lawyers and are
trained to analyze verbal regulations and statutes. While the principles they would
use to interpret visual codes are, in theory, the same as in traditional statutory inter-
pretation, the process is novel enough to make an inherently conservative legal system
wary.
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The problems with each of the possible judicial approaches fur-
ther illustrate the Catch-22 of complex visual codes. The process of
creating complex visual regulations that are specific enough to satisfy
due process requirements necessarily involves constraining them in
such a way that they are capable of stable verbalization. Further, any
relatively attractive process of judicial interpretation requires that the
legal proposition actually be verbalized. At the end of the process, we
are left with essentially nonlegal illustrative examples, devoid of any
propositional force independent of the binding legal verbalization-
and a hefty bill for the costs of producing them.
CONCLUSION
Art can be law. Within the context of development regulations
and planning, this Note has considered some of the theoretical and
practical questions surrounding the creation, administration, and in-
terpretation of pictorial codes. As Part II.A explored, the analogical
and conventional characteristics of iconic signs such as images lead to
inherent problems of vagueness that cannot be cured without strip-
ping the images of much their evocative power and constraining the
range of meanings the images can signify. Simple images, such as
maps and diagrams, are already used in development regulations, but,
it was argued in Part III.B, the use of too many such images will create
a code that merely swaps one set of specialists for another. More com-
plex images have the theoretical potential to regulate aesthetic prefer-
ences, but only if the meaning of those images is rigidly constrained to
the point that it can be expressed with an equivalent verbal transla-
tion. Such a process is not impossible, and in Part II.B a method was
proposed for constructing and interpreting image-lists that take ad-
vantage of commonalities between a series of images within a particu-
lar genus.
However, with some notable exceptions, art cannot be very good
law. Despite the benefits to participation, discussed in Part III.A, the
complex nature of land use controls, planning, and development re-
sists the proposed visual simplification throughout the process and es-
pecially in the long-term administration and interpretation of the
regulations. In the end, when controversies eventually arise and come
before the courts, the pictorial regulations will need to be reduced to
verbal expression before they can be used as elements of legal reason-
ing. Even where images are used purely for the purposes of illustra-
tion, without any intended legal effect, codes must be carefully




The current codes full of bad legal writing and incomprehensible
specifications are not the only option. Law is a conservative profes-
sion, but the accessibility of Anglo-American legal language has come
a long way from the days of Law French and is likely to continue to
improve in the future.115 Simplification of the land use and planning
processes themselves would result in shorter, more accessible codes.
For its own sake, as well, New Urbanism should be wary about incorpo-
rating the evocative rhetoric of its images into the law. Images captur-
ing the possibilities of reinvigorated neighborhoods as exciting and
diverse places should not be dragged through the mud of our adver-
sarial legal system. Once we have beaten and molded these visions to
fit the constraints of legal process, what will replace their prophetic
voice?
115 See generally DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAw 33-282 (1963)
(describing the arc of the "history of the language of the law" from the Celtic invasion
of Britain to the early 1960s).
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